Second Memoir on Pauperism, Post 12

The ideas that I explain are supported not only by reason, but by experience.  Why does the government, which, lately, has shown real solicitude for the material interests of the indigent classes not benefit from this useful experiment?  What is the reason, far from promoting the union of the savings banks and pawnshops, behind the government's resistance to efforts made towards that end?  I only understand it with difficulty.  If one ever comes to really attract all the savings of the poor into the hands of the state, the ruin of the poor and of the state itself cannot fail to occur.  Would the government believe its interests lay in the close connection between itself and the existence of the working classes such that one cannot destroy the government without ruining the working classes as well?  I cannot believe in so dangerous an enterprise.  In my opinion, I see in the combination I have described, the most powerful way that can be used to retain the advantages of the savings banks while avoiding some of the dangers.  I say some, because it is evident that the remedy proposed could, in a given time, become insufficient.

If the administrators of the savings banks can only use the savings of the poor to lend on security, this use of the money is limited and the money not being limited, a day will come when one would be obligated to refuse some new depositors, which would be a great misfortune, because a continual doubt would enter the minds of the poor about the placement of their savings and, consequently, a great temptation not to save.

I would therefore not want the state to definitively close its savings banks to the poor.  I would allow the laws to remain as they are at present; I would only allow the savings banks to pour their money into the Treasury when the pawnshops are not offering a better option.  In this way, one would have all the advantages of the institution while escaping most of the disadvantages.

But this is not yet enough.  Inasmuch as the poor will deposit their money only on the condition of being able to withdraw it at will and inasmuch as easy and sure alternatives will not have been offered, one will not come to results that are at the same time great and certain.

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End of the second memoir

Second Memoir on Pauperism, Post 11

What could be at the same time more simple, practical, and moral than such a system: the savings of the poor placed in this way would pose neither a risk to the state, nor to the poor themselves, because there is nothing more certain in the world than the lending of money with security.

The interest of the borrowed money not being used for anything but to serve as interest on the savings deposited by the poor, one can obtain at the same time these two very useful results; one would no longer need to demand usurious rates from the poor who borrow on security and one could give a higher interest to the poor depositor.   The borrowing rate could be easily reduced to 7% and the interest paid raised to 5%, which would be a double benefit.

One could, it is true, encounter instances of public misery where the savings bank depositors would come to ask for their money, while the number of borrowers at the pawnshop increases beyond measure.  The administration would then receive fewer of the former and obligated to lend more to the latter.

It is easy to see that the peril that one indicates here is only apparent, not real.

There is no establishment that enjoys more credit than a house that lends on security.  Those that lend it money run no risk because they have the collateral itself as a guarantee on the loans.  It is for this reason that pawnshops have always been able to borrow at a low rate even when the state or individual borrowers had no credit.  If the administration I have mentioned finds itself temporarily deprived of the savings of certain poor people, it could borrow to furnish on its own the money to lend on security that other poor people demand, and it would find itself still profitable, since it could borrow at 5% and lend at 7%.

I do not pretend to be the inventor of the system I have described here.  The unification of the pawnshop and savings bank has been taking place for [?] years in one of our most important and advanced cities under the auspices of philanthropic and popular institutions, in Metz.  In the middle of this unification, the administrators of the savings bank have been able to pay 5% interest instead of the 4% to its customers that have deposited less than [?] francs and the pawnshop administrators (the same people) have been able to reduce the interest of the loans to 7%, while in Paris, one still demands 12%.  In addition, the cost of administration of the two establishments have decreased by half since the two establishments have been combined into one.  Finally, to complete the picture, one must add that the Metz savings bank and pawnshop underwent the 1830 revolution and the financial crisis that followed without experiencing any notable embarrassment.

Second Memoir on Pauperism, Post 10

The savings banks are an excellent means to cultivate in the poor the idea of thrift and to profit from interest on their savings.  But these banks cannot safely and indefinitely be the only place for the poor to deposit their money.

Let us succinctly examine these two questions.

I do not pretend to search for and certainly not indicate all the improvements that could be introduced into the savings bank system.  It would go beyond the limits of this article.  I only want to point out the general principle which, it seems to me, should be adpoted and one of the easiest applications of this principle.

The government, instead of trying to attract as much of the yield of the savings banks towards the Treasury and the public funds, should try as hard as is in its power to place these public funds, under its own guarantee, to local use, which minimizes the state's exposure to universal and sudden recourse.  That is the principle.

As for the implementation, here is what I have to say:  There exist today in all the cities of France, pawnshops that offer loans on collateral called "monts-de-piete".  These pawnshops are very usurious establishments because they generally lend without risk at 12% rates.  It is true that the money that they accumulate in this way serves to finance hospices, in such a way that these pawnshops could be considered as charitable establishments in which one ruins the poor in order to prepare for him a refuge from misery.

This simple situation is self explanatory.  It is obvious that, in the interest of the indigent classes and in the interest of order and public morals, we must make haste to find different sources for hospital funds.

From the moment when the tie that binds the pawnshops and the hospitals together is broken, nothing is more natural than to connect the pawnshops to the savings banks and to make of these two things one and the same enterprise.

In this system, the administration will receive savings on one hand, and receive remittances on the other.  The poor that have money to lend will deposit it into the hands of an administration that, requiring security, will disburse it to the poor who need to borrow.  The administration will only by an intermediary between the two groups.  In reality, it will be the poor thrifty person who will lend his savings with interest to the poor spendthrift or unfortunate.

Second Memoir on Pauperism, Post 9

It is evident that as the enlightenment of the people increases and the habit of finding ways to make their savings work spreads throughout the poor classes of France, the small landowner, instead of slowly amassing savings he needs to increase his land holdings in some corner of his home, accumulating a small unproductive fortune through many years, vulnerable to a thousand accidents, it is evident, I say, that the small farmer will bring his savings to the nearest savings bank with the idea of withdrawing it to buy the land he wants.  The savings banks form the only convenient place for the money of these people, who, not wanting to buy land that is not in the immediate vicinity, and in small portions, need to always have their capital available in order to always be in the position to take advantage of the rare opportunities that present themselves.

The French peasant’s taste for land therefore does not prevent, or scarcely prevents the growth of deposits made at the savings banks.  In reality, these deposits are only limited by the capacity of the poor man to save and in his ability to understand, more or less clearly, that it is not in his interest to leave his savings unproductive and vulnerable to risk.

This is what we must understand, because peoples, like individuals, gain nothing by hiding from the truth.  Both must, on the contrary, face the truth squarely in order to see if, next to the evil, one does not perceive, by chance, a remedy.

What is the result of all this?

In sum, I am far from saying that the savings banks, with the constitution we have given them, offer a real danger:  they have none.  I also believe that, even if one cannot find a way to make the risk of future peril disappear, we must still create savings banks.  The physical and moral ills that improvidence and pauperism cause are present and immense, the evils that the remedy would bring are far off and will possibly never take place.  This consideration is enough for me to decide.

All that I wish to say is that it would be imprudent to believe that we have found in the savings banks, such as they exist today, a foolproof solution to the problems of the future and that it is important to avoid thinking that their existence is some sort of universal panacea.  Instead of falling asleep on this false security, the economists and statesmen of our day should try on the one hand to improve the constitution of the savings banks, and on the other to create other ways to use the savings of the poor.

Second Memoir on Pauperism, Post 8

If I consider the actual system in a purely political point of view, its dangers strike me even more.

As for myself, I cannot believe that it is wise to deposit the whole fortune of the poor of a great nation in the same hands, in one place, so to speak, in a way that if some event, improbable though it may be, but possible, could ruin their only and last resources and bring whole populations to despair, and, having nothing to lose, they would easily prey upon the wealth of others.

For a hundred years, the state has undergone more than one bankruptcy: the old regime has done it, the Convention did it.  For the last fifty years, the French government has radically changed seven times and it has been reformed many more times.  During the same time, the French have had twenty five years of terrible war and two near-complete invasions of their territory.  It is painful to remember these facts, but prudence dictates that one not forget them.  Is it in a time of transition like ours, in a time that is likely, by its position, its nature, to have lengthy disturbances, is it in such a time that it is wise to put into the hands of the government, in whatever form, the entire fortunes of such a large number of people?

I cannot believe it and it is necessary that someone prove to me that such a thing is necessary before I can agree to it.

Besides, one must not only fear that the government may appropriate the capital lent by the poor, it is that the borrower himself by his own imprudence may put the lender into an impossible situation by being unable to pay back the money, forcing the lender to declare bankruptcy.

What is the purpose of savings banks?  To permit the poor to accumulate bit by bit, during prosperous times, the capital that he can make use of in times of trouble.  It is therefore in the nature of savings banks that reimbursement be always possible and in small amounts, in other words, in cash.

During a national crisis, in a time of revolution, while the real or imaginary fears on the solvency of the public treasury takes hold on the minds of the people, it would be possible that in a few days the state would be placed in a position to pay several hundred million francs in cash.  Which nevertheless could not be done.  But, who would dare calculate the effect that the announcement of such an event would have on all the lower classes of a great nation such as France?

Towards the praiseworthy goal of dismissing unfounded fears that the recent law on savings banks has caused to arise in the minds of the working class of Paris, Mr. Charles Dupin has since tried to extablish that in France the deposits in the savings banks will not be able to go beyond certain fixed limits, which he has fixed at the maximum of around 250 million, an alaready considerable sum, but for which the state can, without doubt, be responsible.

To deal with the argument that one cannot help but draw an example from England, even more from Scotland, where on a population a little over two million inhabitants, the savings banks, founded only thirty six years ago, already have received deposits amounting to a value of 400 million francs.  Mr. Charles Dupin notes that in England the inferior classes cannot own land, can only put their savings to work by depositing them into the savings banks.

The fact is true, but the conclusion that one must draw is singularly exaggerated.  That people should save to buy land or securities is not important.  What is important is the habit of savings itself, not the final objective of the savings.

I will go farther and say that, if in France, real absolute confidence in the solvency of the savings banks is established among the agricultural classes, one will see, in proportion, flowing toward these banks infinitely more money than is deposited in England.  The cause is simple: with us, the peasant is thrifty, but he only saves for one purpose: to buy land.  His money therefore has only one use or none.  Therefore there are in France, much more than elsewhere, small amounts of capital available for the savings banks that will necessarily find their way to them, if an instinctive fear and experience do not prevent them from remaining in the hands of their owners.

Second Memoir on Pauperism, Post 7

The actual constitution of our savings banks then is a hindrance to the Treasury.  Does it offer to the poor themselves, or to the nation in general all the desired guarantees?  I don’t think so.

What use can the state make of these sums that people deposit in its hands from all corners of France?

Can it use them to provide for the daily needs of the Treasury?  But the needs of the Treasury are limited and the increase of the savings banks is not.  There will come a time when the state, receiving more funds than it can spend, will be constrained to let large amounts of unproductive capital accumulate in its hands.   It is what we have lately seen.  When the last law on savings banks was presented (in February, 1837), the Treasury had in the bank 64 million on which it was paying 4% to the owners and that produced nothing, entirely excluded from circulation, always an undesirable situation.

This is what induced some people to say to one of the orators that participated in the discussions having to do with the last law; that it was necessary to create expenditures to use up the capital, an idea that was developed by some speakers who spoke of large public works that would be financed by the savings of the workers.  As these public works would not be or could not be productive for the state, all this would definitely result each year in burdening the majority of taxpayers with interest on the sums that the poor deposit in the public Treasury.  It would obviously amount to nothing but the poor tax under another name.

If the state does not use the money in the savings banks to provide for the Treasury’s daily needs, the state must place the money in such a way as to bring in interest.  But it is easy to see that there is only one suitable allocation, which is the purchase of income earning securities.  The state can only hold onto the funds in the savings banks on condition that it is returned to the depositor on demand, therefore, it can only place the money of the depositors with the same condition, that it retains the ability to withdraw it to pay the depositor.  But there are only negotiable securities available that offer this possibility.  The state, whether it is represented by the Treasury or by the Bank of Deposits and Consignments, cannot place the money of the poor except on incomes.  There are many serious problems with this, in particular this one:  when the poor deposit, one continually buys securities at a high price because one buys in quantity; when there is a panic or a crisis and the poor ask to withdraw their money, one must sell the securities at a low price because one sells in quantity.   The state is then in a deplorable position that it must always buy expensive and sell cheap, that is, sustain a loss.

This really is what happens and I do not think that anyone here will contest it.

So the money deposited by the poor in the hands of the state is or can easily become very onerous to the state, and, what is worse, it can impose charges on the state, the extents of which are impossible to foresee.

That is not all.  Is this to the advantage of the general interest of the country and its security?  From the economic point of view, I think that it is harmful to ceaselessly attract toward the capital city all the small amounts of capital available from the provinces, which could go towards developing the local economy.  I am aware that a part of this capital go back to the provinces in the form of payments to local officials, public works… But the return of money from the center to the extremities happens slowly and unequally; the largest sums are often spread throughout the provinces that sent the least to the Treasury and that, being poorer and more in debt, are more in need of new roads, new canals…Besides it is always only a part of the savings of the poor that return to the poor in the form of salaries or social improvements.  Most of it, especially after this new law, will be lost in the public funds and will stay in the hands of commerce and the wage earners of Paris.

Second Memoir on Pauperism, Post 6

The idea of industrial associations of workers seems to me to necessarily be fruitful, but I do not think it is ripe.  One must, then, for the present, look for other solutions.

Since one cannot give the workers a proprietary interest in the company, one can at least make it easy for them to accumulate independent wealth based on the salaries that they draw from the company.

Encouraging savings from wages and offering an easy and sure way for the workers to capitalize on their savings, making their savings earn revenue; these are the only ways of which society can make use presently to combat the evil effects of the concentration of property in few hands and to give to the industrial workers the spirit and habits of property owners that a large part of the agricultural class possesses.

The question boils down to the discovery of ways that will permit the poor to capitalize and to make their savings productive.

The first of these ways, and the only one that has been used in France until now is the establishment of savings banks.

I will speak about the development of savings banks.

French savings banks differ a little from one another as far as differences in administration are concerned.  But one can definitely consider them all as establishments that offer a way for the poor to place their savings in the hands of the state, which is charged with the duty to invest them so as to earn an interest of 4%.

It is about the same in England, only the interest offered by the state is a little less.

Does not such a remedy open itself to great dangers?

I have noted first that, in France, the state that gives the poor 4% on their money could easily borrow at 2.5% or 3%.  The state therefore pays about 1% without needing to, for special consideration to the lender.  The resulting sum must be considered as a poor tax  that the government raises from all taxpayers to help the most needy.

Will the state want to continue this charge for an indefinite time?  Can it?  That is doubtful.

The amount in the savings banks has increased within a few years to more than 400 million.  In England, it is at this moment at 400 million.  In Scotland, which only has 2.3 million inhabitants, the savings of the poor amount to nearly 400 million.

If the French poor bring to the public Treasury 400-500 million, which, within a given time is possible and even probable, on which it must pay an interest of 4%, would it be in a position to accept it?  Unless the interest is reduced, which would already be a great misfortune, would not such a sum be more a liability than an asset?

Second Memoir on Pauperism, Post 5

One can then see that the industrial classes will be, independently of general and permanent causes of misery that are already acting upon them, subjected frequently to crises.  It is necessary then to be able to safeguard them against misfortunes that they bring upon themselves as well as those that they cannot help.

The whole question is to know what preventive measures can be used to attenuate these effects.

In my opinion, the problem to solve is the following:
Find a way to give to the industrial laborer, as to the small farmer, the spirit and habits of property ownership

Two principal means present themselves:  the first, and that which seems to be the most effective at first glance, would consist in giving the worker an interest in the company.  This would produce in the industrial classes similar effects as produced by the division of land among the agricultural classes.

It would go beyond the limits of this article to examine all the ways that have been proposed to arrive at this result.

I will content myself to briefly say that these plans for success always run into one of these two obstacles:  for one thing, the entrepreneurial capitalists of industry have nearly all shown themselves to be little inclined to give their workers a proportional share of the profits or to place in the enterprise the little sums that they felt comfortable confiding to them.  I think that in their own interest, they are very wrong in not doing it, but it would neither be just nor useful to oblige them to do it.

Another thing is, when the workers have wanted to bypass the capitalists and associate with each other, pool their funds and direct their own company with the help of a syndicate, they were unable to succeed.  Disorder did not wait to show itself within their association, their agents were untrustworthy, their capital insufficient or without adequate security, their credit almost nonexistent, their commercial relations very limited.  Soon, ruinous competition forced the association to dissolve.  These attempts were often renewed in front of us, especially for the last seven years, but always in vain.

I have been led to believe, nevertheless, that a time is coming when a large number of industries will be able to be run in this manner.  When our workers acquire better knowledge and when the art of forming associations toward the accomplishment of honest, peaceful goals makes progress in our country, when politics does not meddle with industrial associations, and when the government, assured of their object, will not refuse them its benevolence and support, one will see them multiply and prosper.  I think that in democratic times like ours, associations of all kinds will, little by little, replace action by a few powerful individuals.

Second Memoir on Pauperism, Post 4

These unforeseen misfortunes begin for the worker in commercial crises.

One can definitely attribute commercial crises to two causes:
When the number of workers rises without the level of production also rising, salaries decrease and there is a crisis.
When the number of workers stays the same, but the level of production must decrease, many workers become useless and there is a crisis.

We have seen that France is much less exposed than other industrial nations to crises of the first kind because here, the agricultural class is never exposed as immediately and as violently as is the industrial class.

The agricultural class is also less exposed than many other many other manufacturing populations to crises of the second kind because France depends less on foreigners.  I will explain.

When the industry of a nation depends on the whims and needs of foreign countries, located far away, and nearly unknown, one can conceive that these whims and needs change according to causes that one cannot foresee, an industrial revolution is always to be feared.  When, on the contrary, the only or the principal consumers of the products of a country is found within that country, its needs and tastes will not vary in such a sudden and unforeseen way that the producer cannot discover the coming change far in advance, and this change will happen gradually; there is a disturbance in trade, but rarely a crisis.

The world is evidently progressing towards a point where all nations will be equally civilized, or in other words, similar enough to one another so that they can produce within themselves the majority of articles that are agreeable and necessary.  Commerical crises will then become more rare and less cruel.  But that time is still far away; in the present, there are still enough inequality among the knowledge, power, and industry of the different peoples, for some of them to undertake the production, for most of the other peoples, of articles that they need.  These peoples, entrepreneurs of human industry, easily amass immense fortunes, but they are unceasingly menaced by great danger.  Such is the position of England.  The commercial situation of France is simultaneously less brilliant and more certain.  France only exports the [?] of her products; the rest flows to the interior.  For us, the amount consumed continues to rise, but the new consumers are, in general, French.

In France, commercial crises can neither be so frequent, nor so general, nor so cruel as in England.  But one cannot entirely eliminate the possibility of crisis, because there is no known way to balance, exactly and permanently, even within one nation, the number of workers and jobs or the levels of consumption and production.

Second Memoir on Pauperism, Post 3

The most effective way to prevent pauperism among the agricultural classes is assuredly the division of land.  This division exists for us in France, one does not have to fear that that great or permanent misery will ever establish itself here.  But one can still improve the quality of life of these classes and make individual misfortunes less cruel and more rare.  The duty of the government and of the upper classes is to work on it.

It is outside my present subject to look for these means.

If in France the agricultural class is not as exposed to inevitable reverses of fortune as those elsewhere, the industrial classes is scarcely any less exposed.  The remedy that we have with success applied to the misery of the farmer never has been, and it is doubtful that it could ever be, helpful against the misfortunes of the worker.

One has not yet discovered a way to divide industrial property without rendering it unproductive, as one has with landed property; industry has conserved the aristocratic format in modern nations, while everywhere one sees institutions and customs that have their origin in the aristocracy disappearing.

The experience, until the present, has shown that in order to entrust oneself with some hope of success into most commercial enterprises, it is necessary to concentrate large amounts of capital into a few hands.  One encounters some individuals who have great wealth and who employ multitudes of workers who possess nothing.  Such is the spectacle that French industry presents today.  It is exactly what happened in France in the Middle Ages and one is seeing it happen in the agricultural sector of large parts of Europe

The results are similar.  The modern worker, like the medieval farmer, having no property that belongs to him, seeing no way to assure a tranquil future for himself and to elevate himself gradually towards wealth, becomes indifferent to anything that is not present enjoyment.  His carelessness delivers him, defenseless, to all probability of misery.  But there exists a great and important difference between the agricultural and the industrial proletarian: the latter, independently of the habitual misery to which his improvidence can lead, is still exposed constantly to accidental misfortune that he cannot foresee and that does not menace the former.  And his chances of misfortune are infinitely greater in industry than in agriculture because industry, as we will explain later, is subject to sudden crises that are unknown in agriculture.

Second Memoir on Pauperism, Post 2

The accumulation of real estate into a small number of hands does not only accidentally result in misery for a part of the agricultural population; it suggests ideas and habits to a large number of that population that must necessarily, in the long term, bring them to misery.

What do we see each day before our own eyes?  Which members of the inferior classes indulge the most willingly in all the excesses of intemperance and who enjoy living as if there were no tomorrow?  Who show the most improvidence in everything?  Who contract early and imprudent marriages whose only purpose seems to be the multiplication of unhappy people on the earth?

The answer is easy.  These are the proletariat, those who have no property under the sun but their hands.  So long as these same men come to own some piece of land, no matter how small, is it not obvious how their ideas and habits change?  Is it not visible that with some landed property some thought about the future occurs to them?  They become solicitous for the future from the moment that they feel that they have something valuable to lose.  Once they believe that they have the means to put themselves and their children outside misery’s reach, they take energetic measures to escape it and they try, through short-term privation, to assure to themselves a lasting welfare.  These people are not wealthy yet, but they already have the qualities that give rise to wealth.  Franklin often said that with order, activity, and economy, the road to fortune was just as easy as going to market.  He  was right.

Thus it is not poverty that causes the disorganized and improvident farmer; because with a very small field, he can still be very poor.  It is the complete absence of all property; it is the absolute dependence on luck.

In addition, I say that among the ways to give people the feeling of order, activity, and economy,   I know of no more powerful one than to facilitate their acquisition of real estate.

I cite again here the example of the English.  The peasants of England are perhaps, all things considered, more enlightened and they do not show themselves less hardworking than our own.  Why do they, in general, live in such brutal carelessness of the future, the idea of which we do not even have?  From whence comes the disordered taste for intemperance among an even-tempered people?  It is easy to say: in England, the laws and habits are combined in such a way that no part of the land ever falls into the possession of the poor.  His welfare and even his existence never depends on himself, but on the will of the rich, over whom he has no power and who can, if they please, deny or offer him work.  Having no direct or permanent influence on his own future, he stops thinking about it and willingly forgets that it even exists.

Second Memoir on Pauperism, Post 1

I tried to show in a preceding article, that, in our time, private and public charity are powerless to cure the  misery of the poor classes; it only remains to look for ways that could be used to prevent the misery in the first place.

A subject such as this is nearly without natural limits and I feel the need to observe limits not inherent to the subject itself.

Among those whose position places over the limits and to whom the subject of this article applies, it is convenient to establish two categories: on one side are the poor who belong to the agricultural class; on the other, the poor who depend on the industrial classes.  These two sides of my subject must be carried out and examined in detail at least as far as the limits of this article permit.

I will only touch on what is relevant to the agricultural classes, because the great problems of the future do not come from that quarter.

In France, substitutions have been abolished and the equal division of inheritance has penetrated into custom at the same time that it has been established in law.  It is certain then that in France, real estate will never tend to agglomerate into a few hands, as is still seen in some parts of Europe.

But the division of land that, at one time at least, could work against agricultural progress in preventing accumulation of capital into the hands of proprietors with the desire to innovate, produces the immense good of preventing the development of pauperism among the agricultural classes.  When the peasant does not own any part of the land, as is the case in England, the whims or avarice of the masters can suddenly inflict terrible misery on them.  This is easily understood.  The same number of men is not at all necessary to the production of different types of crops, nor required by all methods of cultivation.

When you convert, for example, a field of wheat into pasture, a shepherd can easily replace a hundred laborers.  When, instead of twenty small farms, you combine them into one large one, a hundred men will be enough to cultivate the same fields that used to require four hundred hands.  In the point of view of farming, the conversion of wheat fields into pastures and the consolidation of small farms into large domains is perhaps progress, but the peasant at whose expense these measures are accomplished cannot help but suffer.  I have heard mentioned about a rich Scottish landowner that a change in the way his lands are administered and cultivated have forced three thousand peasants to leave their homes and go seek their fortune elsewhere.   The agricultural population of that Scottish county has therefore found itself suddenly exposed to the same miseries that continually affect industrial populations when new machines are invented.

Such events, that give rise to pauperism in the agricultural classes, increase to an even greater extent among the industrial classes.  Men who are violently separated thus from the cultivation of the soil look for refuge in workshops and factories.  The industrial class therefore does not only grow in an organic and fragmentary way, following the needs of industry, but without warning and by an artificial process following the misery of the agricultural classes, which does not delay in producing a surplus of laborers and destroying the balance that should always be maintained between consumption and production.